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‘Demonstrating the machine guns’: rebellion, violence and state formation in early 
colonial Darfur 
 
In September 1921 reports came to Tenant McNeill, the British Inspector of Southern 
Darfur District, of a force being amassed against the colonial government within his district. 
This force was led by one Abdullahi Suheini, an Islamic holy man who declared himself the 
nabi ‘isa (prophet Jesus), sent to overthrow the Antichrist (the British).1  McNeill made 
preparations for the defence of Nyala, the government merkaz (headquarters) which was his 
base in southern Darfur. Yet he lacked reliable intelligence as to the numbers and movement 
of the rebels. His communications with the governor of Darfur province in El Fasher, some 
two hundred kilometres to the north, openly expressed feelings of isolation and paranoia: 
 
I have been quite unable to get definite news of this man. It is so strange that now I 
fear there is a general conspiracy, and that even those in the town who pretend to be 
going to fight desperately and scoff at the slightest danger must know it... I regret I 
am depressed but you need have no fear that everyone inside this fortification will do 
their utmost.
2
 
 
‘Their utmost’ was not enough to save McNeil. Three days later a rebel force six 
thousand strong attacked Nyala. This was the biggest rebellion against British rule in the 
history of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. McNeill and the district Veterinary Officer, Chown, were 
among those killed in the attack. The government was only saved from utter humiliation by 
the resistance put up against the rebels by government troops and police led by Yuzbashi 
(Captain) Effendi Riziq, soon presented in the British press as a hero.
3
 Reports of the rising 
made much of the vigour of this resistance: one particularly colourful account published 
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twenty years after the event, and based on interviews with those who recalled the rising, 
described ‘each man loading and firing with grim determination till his rifle barrel boiled, the 
police women “luluing” in the background, nearly bursting their lungs.’ This account was 
written by the then District Commissioner of Southern Darfur, M.C. Wordsworth. The same 
account presented the unfortunate McNeill as a Gordon-like hero, killing many of his foes, 
but later being found with ‘lying on his back with his arms outstretched… an empty revolver 
in his pocket.’4 
 
The rising and its defeat thus became the stuff of colonial myth: heroic British 
officials killed, but their loyal Sudanese subordinates saving the day. The strength of the 
rising also led it to attain similar importance in local memory. Wordsworth’s 1940s account 
wrote that ‘to the people of Southern Darfur the Nyala Rising marks an epoch. Dates are 
fixed, births recorded, ages estimated by the year of El Suheini. Similarly tradition will long 
preserve the record of the fiki’s route and encampments.’5 But in the aftermath of the 
rebellion, a government ‘patrol’ (a somewhat euphemistic term for what was an extremely 
violent military force) dramatically revealed the coercive force that lay behind what had 
appeared a weak and isolated outpost of government space in southern Darfur, crushing the 
remaining rebels and confiscating large numbers of cattle. 
 
The Nyala rising appears at first sight to be a classic instance of what Michael Adas 
described as ‘revitalization movements… prophet inspired rebellions among non-Western 
peoples against European-dominated colonial regimes’, followed by crushing colonial 
violence against rebellious subjects.
6
 Certainly this is the way these events were described by 
Hassan Ahmad Ibrahim, the historian of neo-Mahdism in Sudan.
7
 But describing the rebellion 
simply in this manner implies a coloniser-colonised dichotomy redolent of the earlier years of 
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resistance studies.
8
 A substantive body of more recent research has demonstrated that 
rebellions against colonial power which were once presented as manifestations of ‘proto-
nationalism’ were in fact shaped by divisions between and among local groups. Colonial 
‘pacification’ campaigns were therefore also characterised by a ‘politics of alliance’ between 
the colonial state and certain local groups who used the military power of the state as a 
resource in pursuing their own agendas against other rival groups. The colonial state was an 
ally to some even as it was an enemy to others.
9
 This is a point made clearly in the Sudanese 
case by Johnson, who demonstrates that colonial violence against the Nuer of southern Sudan 
in the early years of Anglo-Egyptian rule was directly instigated by and participated in by 
neighbouring, rival Dinka groups.
10
 Similarly, this account of the Nyala rebellion focuses on 
the local encounters between state and society in Darfur which generated both anti-colonial 
resentment and the intensification or creation of local rivalries. But it also suggests that the 
government ‘pacification’ campaign which followed, which has attracted no significant 
attention from historians of Sudan and Darfur, was central to the processes of colonial state 
formation in the region.
11
 The events of 1921-2 in Darfur provide a case study demonstrating 
the complex interplay between coercion and negotiation that characterized colonial rule, 
suggesting insights which are more widely applicable.  
 
Some of the most stimulating recent work on colonial rule in Africa has focused on 
the ways in which relatively cautious colonial states engaged with local societies in attempts 
to make state power productive rather than simply coercive. Colonial agents knew coercion 
had dangerous ‘disordering effects’ on local societies, and shied away from over-reliance on 
expensive military resources. Therefore, it has been argued, state authority was generated and 
contested in the course of local negotiations and accommodations resulting from the 
engagement of Europeans with ‘African logics of power’.12 Thomas Spear has suggested that 
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the ‘inner essences’ of colonial rule ultimately rested on ‘mutual attractions’ between 
colonizer and colonized. These attractions, he proposed, rested on colonial efforts at both 
mobilizing African ambitions for the future and simultaneously appealing to local values and 
institutions.
13
 The widely recognized large-scale violence of early colonial conquest and 
pacification is then, by implication, made into an exception, an unsustainable strategy of rule, 
rapidly abandoned in a shift to the subtler negotiations of Indirect Rule (or ‘Native 
Administration’, as this policy was termed in Sudan).  
 
 Lonsdale also suggested that in most African colonial territories ‘the violence of 
conquest was giving way to the rule of law’ after about 1905. The previously rather 
unpredictable violence of the local state had to be made subject to and contained by colonial 
law in order to demonstrate that the local official was ‘obedient to the immense and 
mysterious source of authority by which he was at the same time supported.’14 Lonsdale’s 
allusion to the mystique of the imagined state resonates with Mitchell’s analysis of the ‘state 
effect’ – ‘the effect of an inert ‘structure’ which somehow stands apart from individuals, 
precedes them and contains and gives a framework to their lives.’15 Yet in Darfur ‘state 
effects’ were not simply produced by the ‘bureaucratisation of force’16, with everyday 
violence at least partially regularized in the practices of punishment enacted by chiefs and 
officials, but also by the continuing spectacular and unpredictable use of technologies of 
violence. This latter tendency demonstrated the existence of another kind of immense and 
dangerous power which supported local officials and which might periodically enter daily 
life. As Lonsdale also acknowledges of the Kenyan case, ‘the violence of conquest was… 
never quite complete.’17  
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The argument made in this article is that the apparent exceptions of early colonial 
‘pacification’ had lasting effects on the way people perceived and dealt with the state. 
Violence set the fundamental terms of the negotiations which followed.
18
 And whilst the state 
did indeed attempt to engage with local partners and local ‘logics of power’, it did not 
altogether abandon the habit of directly reminding subjects of its capacity for large-scale 
violence. The threat of violence thus continued to frame local negotiations and 
simultaneously demonstrated the limits of the state’s capacity to engage Darfuris in a more 
‘productive’ fashion.  
 
Moreover, the prominence of state violence in Darfur in the 1920s and beyond 
discussed in this article is rather similar to that previously observed in other ‘peripheries’ of 
the Sudanese state by Johnson and Willis.
19
 In these peripheral zones, the colonial state did 
very little to appeal to local ‘ambitions’ for the future, but rather hoped to insulate local 
societies from the ‘septic germs of modernity’ (as one governor-general of Sudan memorably 
put it) whilst obtaining the submission and obedience of local subjects, expressed primarily 
by the payment of taxation.
20
 The threat of state violence, at the very least, was an integral 
part of achieving these goals, even when Native Administration was well established: Willis 
notes the last major patrol in the Nuba Mountains was as late as 1945.
21
 The broader 
significance of all this is to suggest that the recent emphasis on negotiation, engagement and 
‘mutual attraction’ in the wider literature on colonial government in Africa runs the risk of 
neglecting the violence which ran throughout the workings of colonial administration, 
violence which was perpetually entwined with and inseparable from those processes of local 
negotiation.
22
 This article first explains the causes of the Nyala rising before turning to 
government ‘pacification’ and the state’s rapid oscillation between the uncompromising 
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display of military might and a willingness to accommodate specific local interests in the 
aftermath of the rebellion to explore these issues in the case at hand. 
 
Contexts: Southern Darfur to 1917 
 
One of the ways in which colonial officials explained the Nyala rising was to assert 
that those peoples involved had ‘no experience of stable government’ before British rule: 
their rebellion was against the simple fact of state control rather than against specific aspects 
of colonial rule. While a great simplification of both the causes of the rising and the pre-
colonial history of this area, this assessment nonetheless contained some truth. Much of the 
territory defined by the colonial state as Southern Darfur District had previously been on the 
fringes of the Darfur Sultanate, a Muslim state that had existed since the late seventeenth 
century.
23
 But the relationship between Sultans and the peoples of southern Darfur was never 
straightforward or settled.  
 
Ecologically, southern Darfur was part of the qoz of Darfur, an area of stabilized sand 
dunes and a level of rainfall which supported a wide range of vegetation for both cultivators 
and pastoralists. Its most numerous inhabitants were Baggara Arabs, cattle pastoralists and 
semi-pastoralists, including Rizeigat, Habbania, Taaisha and Beni Halba groups. But in 1921 
the majority of participants in the rising were drawn from two other groups: Fellata 
pastoralists (tracing their origins to West Africa, and sometimes more recognisably termed 
Fulani) and non-Arab Masalit farmers, who together were estimated to make up eighty per 
cent of the rebels.
24
 The relationship between Masalit farmers and some of their Baggara 
pastoralist neighbours was of central importance to the rebellion and subsequent 
‘pacification’ campaign, as will be demonstrated below. 
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The sultans never fully controlled this area: violent relations between the pre-colonial 
state and local societies were not unusual. In particular, relations with the Baggara oscillated 
between periods of enmity and mutual raids, and periods of peaceable payment of tribute to 
the distant sultans.
25
 There were, however, significant economic links between southern 
Darfur and the Sultanate: pastoralists from the south of Darfur regularly journeyed to 
watering points in the Sultanate’s heartland and sold animal products in exchange for grain 
from Fur farmers.
26
  Moreover, southern Darfur had always been an important frontier zone 
in the economic life of the Sultanate: beyond its fringes further to the south lay Dar Fertit, the 
area in which both the Sultanate and the Baggara carried out their slave raids. The fact that 
slaving parties of the Sultanate passed through the Baggara belt had created a ‘continual 
source of tension between the cattle nomads and the Sultans’, though the Sultanate was also 
an important point of sale for slaves captured by the Rizeigat in their raids south.
27
  
 
From 1874 until 1916 Darfur was ruled by a rapid succession of regimes which all 
attempted to increase the penetration of state power into southern Darfur to a greater extent 
than had the earlier sultans. Turco-Egyptian rule in Darfur was established in 1874, following 
an explosion in tension between the Sultans and Zubayr Pasha, the famous northern Sudanese 
slaver and an increasingly powerful competitor with the sultans in the slave trade.
28
 Turco 
Egyptian rule lasted until 1883, when Mahdist rebels, drawing on considerable support from 
southern Darfur, ejected the Turco-Egyptian regime. The Mahdist state, centred at 
Omdurman on the Nile, ruled in Darfur for the next fifteen years, despite facing significant 
local resistance. This included a rebellion instigated from western Darfur by the faqih (holy 
man) Abu Jummayza, claiming himself to be one of the Mahdi’s khalifas (deputies), and 
leading resistance to the oppression of the Mahdist armies in Darfur. Mahdist rule was 
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brought to an end with the Anglo-Egyptian ‘reconquest’ of Sudan of 1898. At this moment 
Ali Dinar, a grandson of an earlier Sultan of Darfur, re-established the Sultanate as a de facto 
independent state, though also paying tribute to and recognising the formal sovereignty of the 
Sudan Government. Ali Dinar repressed numerous neo-Mahdist risings, though none on the 
scale of the 1880s. In the midst of the First World War, the Sudan Government attacked Ali 
Dinar, playing on fears that as a Muslim ruler he would side with the Ottomans. Darfur 
became part of a colonial Sudanese state once again.
29
  
 
Attempts by these regimes and their military forces to establish regularised control of 
southern Darfur were resented and, at specific times, forcefully resisted as we have seen. The 
Nyala rebellion therefore might be seen as one of a series of reactions against the growing 
penetration of state power into areas that had been previously marginal to the pre-colonial 
state. As with these earlier rebellions, the Nyala rising was motivated by messianic Mahdism. 
Abdullahi Suheini himself was an individual who, having demonstrated credible powers of 
healing, was able to inspire Darfuris to rebellion. The participation of Fellata in the Nyala 
rising of 1921 is particularly noteworthy in this respect: a significant proportion of these had 
origins in Northern Nigeria, itself of course the site of Usman Dan Fodio’s great jihad in the 
early nineteenth century, and Fellata were important supporters of another major Mahdist 
rising in eastern Sudan in 1918.
30
 Yet government reports on the causes of the rising, despite 
their apparent emphasis on religious ‘fanaticism’, also demonstrated awareness of the 
material grievances which motivated participants in the rebellion, particularly the Masalit of 
southern Darfur.  
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Taxation and predation 
 
The extraction of local resources by the state in Darfur was undeniably a significant 
factor behind support for the Nyala rising. Government reports suggested that McNeill’s 
replacement of 'tribal' tribute by individually assessed taxation was a major source of 
resentment. This was a more invasive and systematic means of extraction, which involved 
assessment boards, staffed by muawins (subordinate Sudanese administrative officials) and 
police, measuring the wealth of individual households, rather than a local chief delivering a 
communally assessed and collected ‘tribal’ tribute, more common in southern Darfur under 
the Sultanate.
31
 This innovation coincided with an outbreak of devastating cattle plague. 
Kapteijns argues that one of the most severe characteristics of colonial taxation in nearby 
western Darfur was its inflexibility: the destruction of herds or crops by famine or disease did 
not lead to the modification of tax assessments.
32 
 
Yet while these novel aspects of British colonial taxation surely fuelled discontent, it 
is also clear that the government’s demands for revenue were in some ways familiar as the 
latest in a series of predatory exactions levelled in Darfur by alien regimes during the late 
nineteenth century. The period of Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist rule in Darfur is locally 
remembered as Umm Kwakiya, the time of damnation or gunfire (depending on translation).
33
 
Under these regimes government was often synonymous with military action against 
resistance led by surviving members of the pre-colonial ruling dynasty in Darfur, and tax 
demands had often been experienced as unpredictable and violently levied predations by the 
military. In the early years of British colonial rule tax assessment and collection also 
remained unpredictable and connected with the predations of individual government 
representatives.  
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Adas argues that a sense of deprivation felt by local elites relative to colonial agents, 
including poorly supervised subordinate ‘native’ officials, was a key factor behind many 
prophet-inspired rebellions: this seems to have been a factor of importance in the Nyala 
rising.
34
 In Southern Darfur, a great deal of the assessment of taxation was carried out by the 
muawin of the district. This man was said to have tied up several of the omdas (sub-chiefs) of 
the Masalit during tax assessment and later publicly flogged them for bringing in insufficient 
revenue. The same muawin was also allegedly known for taking women in every village he 
visited, before he even visited the village headman.
35
 Of course, British colonial officials 
often blamed their locally recruited subordinates for bringing the government into dispute.
36
 
Nonetheless, the rebels were said to have called out the muawin’s name in the course of the 
rising and his office was specifically burnt down by the rebels. The omdas who had been the 
targets of his flogging were also leading participants in the rising.
37
 
 
The rebels were, therefore, perhaps less enraged by the imposition of individually 
assessed taxation as such than the manner in which it was carried out. The continuity with 
earlier practices of state predation made the local perception that the British (and the 
Mahdists before them) were simply ‘the Turks’ entirely explicable. All three of these alien 
regimes had functioned in basically similar fashion. One of the battle cries of the rebels 
summed up how government forces at Nyala were viewed (and demonstrated awareness of 
the isolation of the government in this remote region):  ‘You slaves of the Turks, where will 
you drink tonight? It is far from Fasher!’38 
 
However resentment of taxation also existed elsewhere in Darfur: in some areas of 
western Darfur, taxation demands were known to exceed the total crops of villages.
39
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Admittedly, there were also clear signs of unrest throughout the province in the wake of the 
Nyala rising. Yet the major incidence of rebellion broke out specifically in southern Darfur, 
and it drew much of its support from the Masalit people of this district. Perhaps the most 
important factor which fed into Masalit support was a blundering intervention by colonial 
government into the local politics of land, and its consequent creation or exacerbation of local 
inter-group rivalries. The nature of this intervention was itself in part a consequence of the 
character of early colonial engagement with local elites. 
 
‘Tribal boundaries’ and chieftaincy politics 
 
The Masalit in southern Darfur neighboured both Habbania and Fellata pastoralists by 
the colonial period. Colonial records and existing scholarship provide very little information 
about the relationship between these groups in the period before 1917. Maps of the Darfur 
Sultanate suggest that the Masalit did not neighbour the Habbania before the late nineteenth 
century: perhaps this changing geography was a product of the upheavals of the Mahdiyya in 
southern Darfur.
40
 We do at least know that Masalit were competitors with the Baggara in 
slave raids into Dar Fertit in the south: they were also, more simply, farmers neighbouring 
pastoralists.
41
 The relationship between these groups was likely to have been neither fixed in 
enmity nor altogether harmonious. But there is also little known about land tenure 
arrangements or boundaries in this area during the nineteenth century. Mamdani has recently 
argued that the Sultans brought about a ‘detribalisation’ of land tenure arrangements in 
Darfur, via the granting of land rights to favoured individuals known as hakura rights.
42
 Yet 
O’Fahey has stated that there is no record of the Sultanate’s hakura system having spread 
into the south of Darfur past Nyala, itself around eighty miles north of the Masalit land in 
southern Darfur.
43
 Consequently we know little of the exact nature of land tenure 
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arrangements in the area, or whether or how territorial boundaries between these groups were 
defined. 
 
Nonetheless, it seems clear that the early years of colonial rule brought about an 
important shift in the local politics of land between the Masalit and Habbania. Early colonial 
administrators, preoccupied with the idea of creating practical and clearly defined 
administrative units, went about delimiting fixed territorial boundaries between ethnic 
groups. In this specific case, McNeill fixed the Habbania-Masalit boundary in Southern 
Darfur along what he believed to be the ‘traditional’ line of division along the Wadi Khaddai, 
a key watering point.
44
 However, the area around the wadi was likely to have been a zone of 
interaction between these peoples, rather than a strict boundary between them. Wadis in 
Darfur served (and serve) as focal watering and grazing points for the seasonal migration of 
pastoralists; the fertile area around them is also attractive to cultivators. Drawing the 
boundary at the wadi meant that all land south of the wadi was now defined as part of Dar 
Habbania, within which the Habbania now had the right to collect customary dues from 
anyone cultivating or otherwise using what was now defined as their land. The Habbania 
nazir was not slow to seize this opportunity, demanding payments from many Masalit who 
cultivated south of the river. Many of the rebels interrogated by officers after the Nyala rising 
mentioned this new imposition as a major grievance, one suggesting that it was the chief 
reason for Masalit involvement in the revolt.
45
  
 
It may not have been coincidental that McNeill had, just a year earlier, appointed 
Mahmud Abu Saad nazir of the Habbania, and that much of his time was spent in close 
involvement with Habbania politics.
46
 The Habbania chief was one of those men in Darfur on 
whom the colonial government had bestowed relatively vaguely defined and largely 
13 
 
unsupervised administrative and judicial responsibilities from the earliest years of their rule 
in Darfur, even before the policy of Native Administration in Sudan more widely was 
articulated.
47
 Mahmud was a powerful figure in the politics of southern Darfur, and owed his 
position to McNeill’s support. In contrast the Masalit were considered a minor group, and 
McNeill had kept his distance from their chiefs.  
 
So the rebellion of colonised against colonizer, was also directly connected to the 
local rivalry between Habbania and Masalit, and to the engagement of the colonial state with 
particular local elites. For the Masalit, an alien government had aligned itself with the 
interests of the Habbania. A new sense of deprivation experienced by ordinary and elite 
Masalit relative to their Habbania neighbours was just as significant as the deprivation 
experienced by local elites relative to government officials in motivating rebellion.
48
 
 
If land and taxation grievances motivated many of the rank-and-file participants, there 
were also local elites who seized on the rebellion in order to further their own ambitions. The 
state’s accommodation with particular individuals in the local politics of southern Darfur had 
also led to the deposition or marginalisation of other less favoured individuals, several of 
whom proved key figures in the organisation of the rising: they were men who could call on 
sectional or lineage support to join the rebellion. One of the key ringleaders of the revolt was 
an ex-chief of the Ibba section of the Fellata, known to the administration as Andugga, who 
had been deposed, probably by McNeill.
49
 In contrast to the support which Andugga was able 
to bring to the rebellion, the current Ibba chief appointed by the British, Abu Homeira, was 
said to have little authority over his subjects at this time. Another ringleader was the young 
and ambitious nephew of one of the two current chiefs of the southern Masalit, Ibrahim Wad 
Abubakr Abdel Rahman, who was elected a new ‘Sultan’ by the Masalit rebels.50 His uncle, 
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Sultan Tor Kusha, was out of communication with the government before the rising, and did 
nothing to warn them of it. The other main Masalit chief, Melik Dud, languished in prison at 
the time of the rising, imprisoned for various peculations identified by McNeill. The 
government later believed this was one of McNeill’s key errors of judgement, as Melik Dud 
might have restrained his people from participation in the rebellion if he had been free: his 
imprisonment had created a dangerous local vacuum of authority.
51
 The Melik’s 
imprisonment may have also been a factor in actively motivating Masalit support for the 
rising, which perhaps expressed resentment with state interference in local politics. 
 
In sum, a combination of messianic belief, resentment against the unpredictable 
exactions of alien state power, and state interventions in the local politics of land and 
chieftaincy all provided fuel for a large and well-supported rebellion in 1921. But the longer-
term significance of the 1921 rising for Darfur lies in the nature of the government’s response 
to it, and the image that was thus projected of government power. 
 
Patrol 99: showing the government’s strength 
 
After the initial defeat of the rebels at Nyala, they regrouped under new leadership to 
attempt a second attack on the government. The rising in Southern Darfur had also triggered 
signs of unrest throughout the rest of the province. In response the colonial government 
pursued a multi-pronged strategy, in which military violence was closely associated with 
local negotiation and conciliation, to re-assert its authority. First, rebellious populations were 
to see an unprecedented demonstration of the coercive power of the colonial state. Second, 
and simultaneously, the government would make some moves towards conciliating some of 
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the grievances of the rebels. Third, the government would pursue increased surveillance of 
local affairs.  
 
Officials believed that it was the perceived weakness of the government in Southern 
Darfur that had prompted rebels to believe that they could succeed in 1921: the garrison at 
Nyala had been withdrawn not long before the rising.
52
 Even in 1916, the government’s 
invasion of Darfur had progressed through eastern and central Darfur to El Fasher. The south 
of the region in contrast had seen little of the new technologies of violence available to the 
state.
53
 So now the might of the military resources available to colonial government was to be 
exhibited: this was government as spectacle. Savile, Governor of Darfur, wanted to 
demonstrate that ‘the strength of the government is not to be gauged merely by forces at 
Nyala’. The patrol should move with ‘as much display of force as possible’.54 People were to 
be made to realize that behind the apparently isolated Inspector and his police lay a crushing 
and irresistibly powerful coercive force. In Southern Darfur the patrol involved two Mounted 
Infantry companies, three Camel Companies, one hundred Western Arab Corps infantry, 
seven Vickers Guns and two hundred friendlies, the latter recruited from most of the ethnic 
groups in southern Darfur with the exception of the Massalit and Fellata.
55
 At this point, 
colonial government made clear its membership of a long lineage of state violence against 
recalcitrant subjects in Darfur, though at the same time it crucially showed itself to be a more 
potent force than any of its predecessors, by the utilization of terrifying new technologies. 
Machine guns replaced the armed cavalry of the Sultanate as the primary demonstration of 
the government’s mastery of military technology. An estimated two to three thousand rebels 
who had regrouped after their initial defeat at Nyala attacked the patrol at the end of January 
1922. This attack was repulsed by overwhelming firepower: this really was the end of the 
1921-2 unrest.
56
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The government decided to issue a general amnesty for the mass of participants in the 
rising. But the patrol was to arrest all ringleaders, and recover Government arms and 
ammunition taken by the rebels. And all cattle and horses held by both the leaders of the 
rising and, crucially, the villages which were believed to have supported them were to be 
confiscated. The patrol would also take whatever durra (sorghum) it required from 
‘implicated’ villages. Finally the Governor of Darfur wanted the villages of all participants in 
the rising to be razed to the ground, as a ‘reprisal for the burning of native quarters and 
merkaz offices at Nyala’ and also suggested to the Civil Secretary that the burning of crops 
should be considered.
57
 These last two suggestions were blocked by the Civil Secretary: no 
crops were to be burnt and ‘as far as possible’ only the houses of ringleaders should be burnt 
down.
58
 But this would still allow the patrol to confiscate the entire animal holdings of 
implicated villages, and take as much durra as they wanted. In practice, this meant that the 
entire Masalit and Fellata peoples were treated as rebels. The commanding officer of the 
patrol, ‘owing to the difficulty of distinguishing between innocent and guilty held a meeting 
of leading men who asked him to fix an indemnity which he did at a thousand cattle and a 
hundred horses from the Masalit besides those already captured by the Patrol and two 
thousand cattle and three hundred horses from Fellata’. The leading men ‘seemed satisfied 
and went to collect them’.59 However by February 1922, 8,600 cattle had been captured in 
total by the patrol, many more than this initial indemnity.
60
 The Masalit and Fellata were said 
to have lost almost everything they had after the depredations of the government patrol.
61
 
This was pillage on a huge scale. 
 
While the patrol had its most dramatic and punitive impact in Southern Darfur, there 
were displays of coercive force throughout restless areas of the province to make a 
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spectacular impact in the minds of the people, who would internalize a sense of the state’s 
awesome power. At Kebkebia in Northern Darfur, Bimbashi (Major) Craig gave ‘a 
demonstration ride... in the Rolls Royce box car [an armoured car equipped with a machine 
gun turret]. The demonstration created a great impression - a large number of the people 
locking themselves in their houses’.62 Meanwhile, Sultan Endoka in Dar Masalit was also 
‘very impressed with the cars and machine gun, out of which they fired some sixty rounds of 
ammunition at a target as a demonstration for the Sultan’. Chiefs were to be reminded of the 
government’s power as well as their subjects. On the border between Western and Southern 
Darfur, where one village had resisted taxation assessment, the patrol rounded up fifty men 
and the village was collectively fined £E100.
63
 
 
Exhibiting ringleaders  
 
The government also pursued the individuals who it believed to be the leaders of the 
rebellion with great ruthlessness. The colonial state’s profound deficit of local knowledge 
was exhibited in its dependence on local information to identify and find the ‘ringleaders’. 
So, in a proclamation of 1921 which defined the ringleaders as ‘outlaws’, rewards were 
offered for their capture or killing: rewards would be paid to those ‘bringing the head of each 
man together with some persons known to the Government who can identify the head as that 
of the person for whose killing the reward is intended’.64 The government’s means of 
identifying dead ringleaders, killed by people who it did not know, thus also depended on 
those it judged to be reliable local intermediaries. This was a state which could not see. When 
those identified as leaders survived their capture, questions remained as how to deal with 
them. One captured fugitive apparently declared to his captors: ‘prove the least thing against 
me ... and I shall not complain if you hang me’.65 The absence of admissible evidence against 
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ringleaders, which this man was apparently well aware of, reinforced the preference of 
officials for the simple killing of suspected ringleaders. The Governor of Darfur was ‘very 
glad Adam El Gellabi [one of the ringleaders] was shot’ as it prevented the ‘farce’ of having 
‘no evidence whatever’ against him.66  
 
The British also used the spectacular display of the corpses or heads of vanquished 
enemies in order to reinforce their authority. While the Darfur sultans had enacted such 
displays in the capital of the pre-colonial state, El Fasher, colonial officials now used Nyala, 
their local district hedquarters, as the stage for such performances, demonstrating the state’s 
penetration into the peripheries of the old Sultanate.
67
 Two ringleaders were killed by a force 
of ‘friendlies’ (including Rizeigat, Messeria Arabs and Massalit sent up by the chief Melik 
Dud) in January 1922, and their heads were exposed on poles at the entrance to the Nyala 
police headquarters.
68
 When another rebel leader died from his wounds in the Nyala prison, 
the government put on a rather theatrical show with his corpse the next day. Troops paraded 
around Nyala, and the man's body was carried on a broken angarib (rope bed) by four 
prisoners into the centre of the town, where it was ‘publicly burnt before all the Nyala 
inhabitants’.69 Criticism of this action by the Governor of Darfur was ignored by the isolated 
local District Commissioner, who clearly wanted to avoid any risk of understating his own 
personal power. Officials noted that such gruesome spectacles were intended to deepen ‘the 
impression that the government is too strong to fight against’.70 
 
Chiefs and Patrol 99 
 
The aftermath of the Nyala rising also saw most of the incumbent local elite in 
Southern Darfur decisively throw in their lot with the government. Some of them were richly 
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rewarded for this. Moreover, state imperatives and local politics continued to influence one 
another in the course of the ‘pacification’ campaign as they had done in the outbreak of 
rebellion. As other recent studies have shown, even when colonial states asserted their 
dominance in brutal and destructive fashion, opportunities continued to exist for local actors 
to use state power to advance local agendas, and sometimes to exploit opportunities for 
individual accumulation.
71
 And the government patrol in southern Darfur relied on the 
knowledge and assistance of chiefly intermediaries to achieve its goals. Again there is 
precedent for this alliance with specific local groups to fight against enemies of the state in 
Darfur during both the Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist period: notably General Gordon, when 
Governor General of Sudan, also used the Baggara of southern Darfur against other resistant 
local populations.
72
   
 
The Habbania pursued their rivalry with the Masalit through participation in the 
government patrol from which they benefitted materially. Cattle taken from the Masalit and 
the Fellata were originally to be kept by the state, but having been captured in such large 
numbers and kept in overcrowded zaribas (thorn enclosures) with a high risk of disease, over 
5,000 of the animals were distributed on loan to the loyal nazirs as amanat (property held in 
trust). However this became a permanent arrangement, and many of the chiefs did not pay for 
the cattle nor list them for taxation. Habbania men were the most active in the capture (or 
raiding) of Masalit cattle in the course of the patrol. Their Nazir Mahmud Abu Saad brought 
many of the captured cattle to Nyala, but also ‘swapped any good animals among the loot for 
inferior ones from [the Habbania’s] own herds’.73 So while the patrol devastated Fellata and 
Masalit economies, it also helped other groups (and especially their leaders) in Southern 
Darfur to make up for their losses from the cattle plague of 1921.
74
 Silver and bronze medals 
were handed out to the chiefs who participated either in the defence of Nyala, or (more 
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numerously) participated in the patrol. Abu Saad was one of those who received a silver 
medal, and while he was said to have helped himself personally to around 200 Masalit cattle - 
apparently a personal gain of unique size among the chiefs who participated in the patrol - 
this did not concern the government.
75
  
 
Many chiefs were therefore closely associated with the violent power of the patrol of 
1921-2, in the eyes of their own subjects as well as those of rival neighbouring groups. When 
troops arrived in Dar Rizeigat in December 1921 the Rizeigat chief Ibrahim Musa and the 
muawin gathered together the Rizeigat omdas (sub-chiefs), sheikhs and people for a 
‘demonstration of the machine guns’. The patrol would then ‘make a tour in the Rizeigat 
country to show off the troops to the people’.76 This was a deliberate attempt to reinforce 
Ibrahim Musa’s position among his people: immediately before the patrol’s arrival two of the 
Rizeigat omdas from a rival section of the Rizeigat had refused to recognize Ibrahim Musa’s 
authority, withholding tribute revenue they had collected.
77
 Ibrahim Musa was a valuable ally 
to the state: he had given significant support in the initial conquest of Darfur in 1916 and had 
provided fifty of the two hundred ‘friendlies’ that participated in Patrol 99. Accordingly, the 
trouble in Ibrahim’s dar was not seen to be principally a result of the nazir’s own misrule but 
rather had been caused by a ‘long absence of troops from this district’.78 Sure enough, 
challenges to Ibrahim Musa’s authority faded away after this tour. 
 
Chiefs also pursued individual political agendas when responding to the state’s 
demand that the ‘ringleaders’ of the rebellion be produced. The dependence of the state on 
the local knowledge of these men in order to find the ‘ringleaders’ could easily be exploited. 
Most strikingly, the Fellata nazir Abu Homeira (now appointed over both main Fellata 
sections) had five so-called fuqara (holy men) arrested in early 1922; all these men were all 
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plotting to complain against Homeira to the government.
79
 Yet local elites also sometimes 
sheltered those targeted by the state for arrest, particularly sub-chiefs who had more distant 
relationships with and affiliation to the state. Before his capture, Adam el Gellabi, one of the 
leaders, had hidden in the Masalit village of Deleiba where ‘all the people knew of (his) 
presence and they and all the people of the omodia [the sub-chieftaincy division] together 
with their omdas and sheikhs swore not to divulge his presence to the Government’.80 Adam 
was in fact the son of the local omda, and once he was killed, the omda, wakil omda [deputy 
sub-chief] and village sheikh were all heavily fined.
81
 Government was signaling its 
expectation that its chiefly intermediaries would put government priorities ahead of their own 
kin interests.  
 
Where chiefs did assist government in the arrest of those believed to be ringleaders, 
they stood to gain material rewards and improved standing with the government. Nonetheless 
the fear of losing legitimacy among their subjects by handing over popular suspects meant 
that there were limits to how far they simply acted as agents of the state – their position 
remained awkwardly balanced. The best example of these tensions is Melik Dud Murra of the 
Masalit, who had been in prison at the time of the rising. He gave the state great assistance in 
the capture of ringleaders, providing men to hunt ringleaders down. The use of these local 
‘friendlies’ was felt to be peculiarly effective: McNeill’s successor in Darfur commented that 
‘surprise was essential’ to catch the ringleaders and ‘uniforms were considered undesirable’. 
The Inspector commented on one occasion that the Melik’s men conducted ‘what was 
practically a disciplined exhibition, with which any force of police or MI (Mounted Infantry) 
could be satisfied… they were fighting without government supervision of any kind, on 
behalf of the Government at considerable risk to themselves’.82 Such effective ‘exhibitions’ 
did not incur the cost of further government patrols. By the later part of 1922, Dud Murra had 
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been showered with rewards from the government and his ‘swollen head’ had made him 
unpopular with the other chiefs of the region.
83
  
 
However, in 1924 it was clear that under Dud Murra’s watch, two leading rebels were 
hiding among the Masalit with impunity. One of these, Mohammed Kurtal, had escaped 
while awaiting execution in Nyala prison in 1922, wriggling out of his handcuffs and 
removing the bars from the window of his gaol cell.
84
 Since then, he had been on the run. The 
DC commented that ‘if the outlaws were captured or killed the effect on the Masalit would be 
very beneficial… Kurtal has the reputation of being a magician chiefly owing to his former 
spectacular escape from Nyala prison.’ The DC suggested Dud Murra ‘could easily have 
arrested or killed them, but feared to do so,’ perhaps because of this popularity.85 Only the 
arrival of a bullying police mulahiz [inspector] at Melik Dud’s village finally pushed the chief 
into participation in a police operation which finally apprehended Kurtal. The mulahiz was 
still remembered several years later as ‘the Masalit’s bogey man, the giant with his club Um 
Deldumana terrified them. A word picture of him brings a sickly unwilling smile to the 
King’s [Dud’s] countenance.’86 Once more, the state was being enacted by coercion and 
intimidation, though in this case a particular individual rather than a large military patrol 
performed this role. 
 
For most of the leading chiefs of Southern Darfur then, the Nyala rising was a crucial 
moment in defining their alignment with the colonial state. Government responses to the 
rising created opportunities to pursue private agendas of profit and political ambition. And in 
some cases the impact of the rising pushed chiefs off the tightrope they walked between the 
demands of government and the need to protect the interests of their people. Chiefs were now 
more obviously linked to a violent and alien state. 
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Violence, negotiation and state formation 
 
In terms of forging local imaginations of the state in Southern Darfur, the aftermath of 
the Nyala rebellion was surely a significant moment. In the late 1920s stories were told by 
Habbania about the conduct of the patrol (which they or their fathers accompanied) under the 
leadership of OC [Officer Commanding] Grigg: 
 
There he stood with his little stick in his hand, no weapon, but only his stick and held 
us back till the machine guns had fired burrrrr. Then the Masalit fled and he lowered 
his stick and let us go after them.
87
  
 
I heard my father say that when Grigg Bey led the patrol against the Masalit their fikis 
wrote lists of the Koran on paper and washed off the ink and drenched a bull with it 
and then sent the bull to charge the Government army; but it was shot dead with a 
machine gun before ever it reached them!
88
 
 
The power of the machine gun is the dominant motif, including its capacity to 
overpower spiritual forms of protection.  But what should also be noted is the close 
association of this new technology with the individual British officer, apparently armed with 
only a stick.
89
 The state itself was perhaps understood to consist of these varying elements: 
the isolated local administrator and the usually invisible technologies of violence which lay 
behind him. As noted at the beginning of this article, the rising remained a key event in local 
memory in the 1940s: it is unlikely the violence of the patrol and the ‘state effect’ it produced 
was forgotten either. Moreover, in the course of the patrol, British officials in southern Darfur 
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visibly resembled their pre-colonial predecessors, surely appearing to fit into a deeper history 
of state violence in this zone. The Darfur Sultans had sent magdums (commissioners) to 
southern Darfur as their representatives in this peripheral region. These men had functioned 
as mobile and semi-autonomous warlords commanding sizable war-bands, combatting 
resistance to the Sultan’s rule, but also settling local disputes.90  
 
These multiple functions of the pre-colonial local state were also enacted by British 
colonial administrators in the aftermath of the rebellion: in 1922 the coercive extraction of 
animals from local economies and the extra-legal killings of outlawed ringleaders were 
accompanied by some efforts at conciliation with those groups that had rebelled. Violence did 
not preclude negotiation. The new British administrator (now termed District Commissioner) 
of Southern Darfur, accompanied the patrol on its tour of pillage, in order to hear and respond 
to local grievances.
91
 This might at first appear a meaningless gesture, but the government 
actually subsequently moved the Masalit-Habbania boundary ten miles south of its present 
location, to the benefit of the Masalit.
92
 (Officials did not define any of the Habbania’s other 
boundaries until the 1940s: they were now well aware of the ‘great feeling’ that boundary 
disputes were capable of causing).
93
 Taxation resentments were also addressed after the 
rising. The voracious assessment boards were abolished in Darfur, and a general cultivation 
tax was rather set at a flat rate, eliminating over-assessment by muawins.
94
  
 
Subjects in Southern Darfur thus experienced the bi-polar character of the state, what 
the Nuer in southern Sudan would come to call the ‘government of the left’ (the useable civil 
institutions of the state, including the DC) and the ‘government of the right’ (the military 
which brought only death and destruction), in the course of a single patrol.
95
 Crucially, 
however, the association between the two was clearly very close: the DC, a civilian official, 
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had nonetheless personally accompanied the military patrol, and would later tour this district 
with a very different, much smaller retinue, still hearing grievances and sometimes adjusting 
local regimes of governance accordingly. Some of the subsequent willingness to deal and 
negotiate with British officials in the course of local political disputes was surely linked to 
local perceptions of their closeness to the military apparatus of state, which could be used 
against people who did not recognize their authority. There was therefore also, by the same 
logic, a clear benefit to engaging with the DC: he could keep that violent force out of local 
life. There was also a similar reason for local people to engage and sometimes put up with the 
power (and abuses) of local chiefs: these men were also now associated with the military 
power of the state, yet recognizing their authority might also be a means of keeping that 
power at arm’s length.96 State violence underpinned people’s willingness to negotiate and 
engage with the state and the local chiefs who were its auxiliaries. 
 
Indeed after 1922 the association between state and chiefs became ever closer, and the 
visibility of the state in southern Darfur was also increased. Chiefs were given more clearly 
defined judicial powers, more explicitly derived from the state which had shown itself such a 
dangerous force to oppose. This was part of a wider trend towards ‘Native Administration’ or 
‘Devolution’ in Sudan, but the events of the Nyala rising generated additional support for 
changes in central government policy. The Civil Secretary of Sudan, who took a leading role 
in determining administrative policy, noted in correspondence with the Governor General that 
during the Nyala rising and patrol ‘practically every tribal sheikh in the district (excepting 
those of the Messalit and Fellata)… acted loyally and gave active assistance to the 
Government’.97 The rising had been in part caused by an overly close relationship between 
the local state and Habbania elites: however, this was rapidly forgotten. Rather, the co-
operation of most of the chiefs of Southern Darfur in the patrol (sometimes itself extracted 
26 
 
under duress, as we have seen) suggested that the relationship between chiefs and state 
should be more regularized and clearly defined. Strong chiefs would be powerful allies in a 
continuing fight against neo-Mahdist ‘fanaticism’: the imprisonment of the Masalit melik 
before the rising was now perceived as a serious error which had allowed rebellion to take 
hold, as noted previously. But this was not simply about negotiation and engagement with 
local logics of power: chiefs themselves, over the next ten years given ever increasing powers 
of imprisonment, flogging and fining over the members of entire tribes, became to a 
significant extent the instruments of devolved colonial violence.
98
 
 
Alongside this shifting direction in policy, a new government position was created in 
Southern Darfur District. Part of McNeill's failure in the eyes of his superiors had been his 
inability to build relationships with local peoples in southern Darfur, and his resultant 
incapacity to gather effective intelligence and knowledge of local conditions.
99
 As a result the 
government created the position of Assistant District Commissioner for the Baggara who 
would ‘hear and rectify grievances’ and would be crucial to ‘restoring confidence and 
contentment and pacifying the country’.100 The ADC would then continue efforts at local 
engagement which had begun during the military patrol. And despite being apparently 
assigned to the Baggara, the ADC’s sub-merkaz was actually located at Kubbe, in the heart of 
Masalit territory. The rebellious Masalit would be closely supervised.
101
 The state’s own 
surveillance and intelligence capacity in Southern Darfur was thus increased. 
 
In essence, the approach followed in Darfur after 1922 was for chiefly and state 
authority to be more institutionalised and more closely intertwined. Selective local alliances 
and knowledge were to be replaced by a more consistent and bureaucratic system of ‘Native 
Administration’ which encompassed all local groups and (in theory) regularised the dealings 
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of their elites with the state. Yet although the pragmatic partnerships between local officials 
and chiefs were key to the construction of colonial authority, chiefs in southern Darfur were 
not simply all-powerful ‘decentralised despots’. Colonial officials in fact were often the focal 
point for frequent continued protest against chiefs, driven by a combination of factional 
rivalries within ‘tribal’ units and grievances against chiefly exactions. This drew on a deeper 
history of interaction between state and local chieftaincy politics in Darfur. But the new legal 
norms of the colonial state also became a discursive resource for opponents of chiefs to 
deploy in their (sometimes successful) efforts to persuade officials to punish or depose their 
leaders. People were not endlessly willing to endure chiefly abuse in order to keep the state 
out of local life: rather, the state could become a valuable supporter in local political 
disputes.
102
 But, barring a minor and easily repressed uprising in 1927 in western Darfur, 
people had learned that direct attacks on the state were too dangerous to attempt: the colonial 
state was now a fact of political life which had to be dealt with. And colonial violence 
underpinned these basic facts. Even in apparently the most stable period of colonial rule in 
Darfur the state remained ready to deploy its military force to make an impression on local 
minds: to ‘demonstrate’ the violence of the state. And it seems the state’s own institutional 
memory of the Nyala rising was one factor which lay behind this continued recourse to such 
demonstrations.  
 
While Johnson suggests that the military became ‘less and less in evidence’ among 
the Nuer of south Sudan after 1920, in Darfur the colonial military presence remained rather 
visible throughout the Condominium period.
103
 As well as several military officers working 
as long-serving District Commissioners in Darfur up until the late 1940s, the Western Arab 
Corps (WAC), the branch of the Sudan Defence Force based in Darfur, frequently appear in 
colonial records as being ‘on maneuvers’ in various parts of the province: the military also 
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made appearances at the annual ‘tribal gatherings’ which were held in the several districts of 
the province.
104
. One particular report demonstrates this especially well.  
 
In 1934 the DC of Southern Darfur District and one of his ADCs, William Luce, went 
on tour in Southern Darfur with a company of the WAC. They met the company near a 
village called Kileititi: the military had been accompanied to this point by one of the Baggara 
chiefs, Ali Senussi of the Taaisha people. Of course this restated the close relationship 
between military force, individual British officials, and local chiefs. Subsequently a difficult 
meglis (meeting) between officials and Gimr elites local to the area resulted in the 
administration conceding the election of a new sheikh of sheikhs to represent the Gimr on the 
local Native Court. But immediately after this an episode of field firing was shown to both 
chiefs and people. Luce recorded this in detail: ‘the idea was to show them what the 
Government can do when roused and to make them think before they tried a repetition of the 
1921 affair’, referring explicitly of course to the Nyala rising. The details are worth 
recounting: ‘The Company had rigged up a small dervish village… they had also erected 
three stuffed figures in front of the village, supposed to represent “fekis”.’ Luce went on to 
describe the subsequent ‘fun’: rifles and machine guns were fired, the grass hut was set alight 
‘to the astonishment of the crowd’. Jars that had been filled with water were shot, sending 
water spouting up, to add to the spectacle. Luce admitted that the company used ‘far more 
ammunition than was necessary’, and the rigged village was ‘reduced to a heap of 
smouldering ashes.’ This was all a very carefully stage-managed piece of theatre. Luce ‘took 
the crowd up to have a look at the debris’ and was subsequently gratified to overhear the 
departing Gimr saying ‘Wallahi, hakuma shedid’ – ‘By God, the government is strong.’105  
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Conclusion  
 
The Nyala rising was a turning point in the history of relations between the colonial 
state and local societies in Southern Darfur, and indeed across the province as a whole. This 
was the last time that such large-scale violent resistance to the state’s authority would be 
marshaled in Darfur. In response the colonial state put on an unparalleled demonstration of 
the scope and efficacy of its coercive power in Southern Darfur, simultaneously theatrical and 
brutal. And the disparity between its own military capacity and that of rebellious subjects was 
also exposed as being too wide to be challenged. The machine gun was an unbeatable enemy.  
 
Yet force also provided the grounds for negotiation. Some Darfuris now started to 
deal more directly with the state perhaps because they saw it as overwhelmingly powerful: 
those who gained the support of the state in their local political struggles would gain a 
powerful ally indeed. And local representatives of the state had also shown themselves to be 
not altogether unreceptive to local demands and elite interests. Even as the patrol looted local 
economies a single British official listened to local grievances and revised a much-hated 
boundary; taxation demands were amended; most significantly, the state associated itself 
more closely with local chiefs, devolving legally defined powers to these men whilst 
simultaneously increasing their own direct surveillance of local affairs. But while more 
systematic engagement between state and subjects developed after 1922, the performance of 
violence remained an important tool that could be used by the state to project its authority. 
Power was never made wholly productive; the colonial state in Darfur was not a ‘modern’ 
state in the Foucauldian sense. Rather the use of violent spectacle, a tool of pre-modern 
power in Foucault’s schema, remained crucial in constituting colonial authority.106 The state 
continued to present itself as a force too powerful to resist: the spectacular and theatrical 
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violence described above referred back to and reinforced local memories of large-scale early 
colonial violence. 
 
Nonetheless, understanding colonial rule, and its ‘improbable’ stability107 (for an 
admittedly limited period of time, especially in Darfur) does not depend on an interpretative 
choice between a view of state power as either consistently violently coercive or perpetually 
willing to compromise: rather it requires the acknowledgement that both violence and 
negotiation remained interactive elements of colonial authority, shifting in emphasis and 
manner over time, but nonetheless continually intertwined. This may seem rather obvious, 
but just as work that has emphasized the negotiated aspects of colonial rule has underplayed 
the role of violence in maintaining colonial authority, so a counter-tendency to re-focus 
attention on violence in some of the most recent scholarship on empire (of which this article 
is part) equally runs the risk of understating the local negotiations in which colonial states did 
attempt to engage the partial consent of subject populations.
108
 In the case of Darfur, we 
might understand colonial authority to be a limited version of hegemony: in which consent to 
rule, generated in processes of local negotiation focused on chieftaincy politics, was extracted 
rather than freely given – indeed it was very firmly underpinned by the coercive potential of 
the state.
109
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